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Drafting and Use of Opinion Letters of Counsel
Linn J. Raney*
N MANY BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS counsel is required to render his opin-
ion to non-client parties prior to or at the closing. Such opinions are
required to be expressed in a letter, which is prepared by counsel for his
client, for the benefit of another party, or parties, to the transaction, or
is addressed directly to the non-client party or parties. Extraordinarily
large sums, compared to an individual's net worth, may be involved in
even the most ordinary business transactions, and the question of
whether counsel might be personally liable to a non-client party to a
transaction, based on an inaccuracy in his opinion letter, becomes rele-
vant when economic injury to such party occurs from the transaction.
This article outlines the kinds of opinions which counsel may render
to a non-client via letter, the functions of such opinions in a transaction,
and the preparation of opinion letters in view of the possibility of coun-
sel's liability thereon to a non-client party. Material for the article was
obtained in part from interviews with a number of individuals familiar
with transactions commonly involving opinion letters and more particu-
larly transactions wherein opinion letters are transmitted to non-clients
for their reliance. Transactions specifically referred to are: capital
financing transactions, transactions and proceedings involving corporate
securities, including preparation of registration statements for filing with
the Security and Exchange Commission, agreements among underwriters
for the sale of securities, and mergers, and sales of property involving
corporate parties.
Opinion letters drafted by counsel representing a corporate entity
for the purpose of transmission to a non-client party to a transaction are
necessarily more elaborate than letters which might be drafted by coun-
sel representing an individual person. Because this is so, this article
focuses upon transactions involving corporate parties. Nevertheless, ap-
plicability of the article to opinions of counsel in conjunction with trans-
actions involving individuals is apparent.
Kinds of Opinions and the Attorney's Role in Preparing Them
There are generally two kinds of opinions which may be contained
in any opinion letter regardless of the party to whom it is addressed. One
is an opinion as to a legal fact. For example, an opinion as to whether
a particular state legislature has passed a particular statute or whether
a corporation is qualified to do business in a particular state.' Such an
* B.M.E., Univ. of Florida; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School;
Patent Agent with Watts, Hoffmann, Fisher & Heinke of Cleveland.
1 See, Restatement, Torts § 545, comment a (1938).
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opinion may be thought of as informational and is, for practical purposes,
either correct or incorrect. The second kind is an opinion as to the law,
which predicts the result if a given fact situation reaches the courts.
There may be no correct opinion in this second situation, depending upon
the novelty of the situation, and the state of the law on the question
involved.2 Most frequently opinion letters addressed to a non-client party
to a transaction are in the nature of a verification of the legal facts repre-
sented by counsel's client to the non-client party. Letters of this nature
are generally required as a condition precedent to closing the transaction
and for the most part are neither advisory in function nor, in the final
analysis, expressive of opinions.3
Opinion letters to non-clients might be thought of as distinguishable
from opinion letters to clients in that counsel is serving two masters in
preparing his opinion in the former instance. Counsel might well find
himself in the position of rendering an opinion adverse to his own client's
interests and which could prevent his client from consummating an im-
portant transaction. When counsel's professional judgment is at odds
with his client's best interests he may find it extremely difficult to be
objective in formulating his opinion.4 Accordingly, counsel may be
tempted to assume his role as an advocate of his client's position, or
avoid a definite opinion where possible. Serving one client and render-
ing an opinion to an adverse party, seems to many counsel significantly
at variance with their traditional role as an advocate.
Is the "two master" distinction valid? If it is, then counsel's tradi-
tional role as his client's advocate has not been altered by the develop-
ment of the law relating to economic injury in business toward favoring
full disclosures and good faith dealings.5 The trend in the law toward
such concepts and the extent of its development might well present some
nice questions as to how counsel's traditional adversary role has been
affected. However, as a practical matter, if there is a present possibility
that counsel, by advocating his client's position in a transaction or con-
sidering himself an adversary to non-clients, may subject himself to per-
sonal liability to the party relying on his opinion the shift in the law is
far enough.
2 Ibid. The Restatement suggests that if a representation as to a matter of law in a
transaction is a representation of fact, it may be relied on as though it were a repre-
sentation of any other fact. But a representation as to a matter of law is a represen-
tation of opinion of legal consequences of facts known or assumed by the maker and
recipient, and the recipient is justified in relying on the representation as if it were
a representation of any other opinion. See also Prosser, Torts § 104 (1964).
3 One Cleveland, Ohio, attorney interviewed in March 1967 said: "Don't give opin-
ions of facts," meaning that it is rather senseless to express an opinion relative to
a hard fact which may be found by investigation. This logic is not disputable but
since the "facts" involved in closing letters are "legal facts," attorneys can hardly
refuse to give their "opinions" relative to them.
4 Interview with Cleveland attorney, March, 1967.
5 Prosser, Torts § 103 (3rd ed. 1964); Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203.
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The present state of the law relating to business dealings is believed
to be such that there is a possibility that counsel can be found to be
liable to a non-client party who relies upon counsel's opinion to his detri-
ment in a transaction. Accordingly, counsel is acting against his own
interest in viewing himself as a partisan when rendering his opinion to
the non-client party. Counsel's responsibility in rendering his opinion is
both to the party relying on it and to himself as a professional; his opin-
ion as far as possible must be objective, and independent of his relation-
ship with his client. It is important that counsel preparing an opinion be
aware that his role in a business transaction deviates from that in
litigation.
Functions of Opinion Letters in Specific Transactions
There are certain basic representations of legal facts which counsel
are required to verify and which are relied upon by non-clients in most
transactions involving corporate parties. Such representations are typi-
cally: that the corporation in question is duly organized and in good
standing under the laws of the state in which it is incorporated; that it is
authorized to do business in all states in which it is transacting business;
that it has the capacity under its charter, bylaws, and applicable state
and federal laws, to enter into the subject transaction; and that the
necessary corporate action has been taken to enable it to conclude that
transaction. 6
In agreements involving financing, additional legal facts required to
be verified by counsel's opinion may run the gamut of the items required
in the aforementioned examples of transactions. Such transactions gen-
erally require opinions to the effect that entering into the agreement will
not violate the terms and conditions of any pre-existing contract of the
corporation; that the corporation is not involved in any unusual litiga-
tion, or any litigation not set forth in its financial statements; that the
condition of the corporation's title to various assets listed in its financial
statements is as represented; and appropriate statements relative to the
corporation's debt structure and long term contracts. If stock or property
is pledged for collateral under the terms of the agreement, counsel's
opinion will state that the stock is duly authorized, validly issued and
fully paid, or will disclose the state of the title to the pledged property
and the priority of the lender's claim to the property under the agree-
ment in the event of default.7
Opinions of counsel in connection with security registrations are
drafted in accordance with the requirements of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Form S-1. Form S-1 requires an "opinion of counsel
6 Interviews with Cleveland attorneys, February, March 1967.
7 Ibid.
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as to the legality of the securities being registered, indicating whether
they will when sold be legally issued, fully paid and non-assessable, and,
if debt securities, whether they will be binding obligations of the regis-
trant." 8 Opinions of counsel relative to the legality of the issuance of
capital shares are also required where a discount on such shares is shown
as a deduction from capital stock on the most recent balance sheet filed
by the registrant. Opinions as to the legality of such shares must recite
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions and cite cases thought
by counsel to be controlling.9
In addition, where any shares of the registrant have a liquidation
preference exceeding their par or stated value, counsel must file an
opinion as to whether the excess valuation of such shares places a re-
striction on surplus, and as to remedies of security holders before and
after any dividend reducing surplus below the amount of the excess.
Citation of constitutional and statutory authority, as well as controlling
cases, is also required in such an opinion.' 0
It is apparent that opinion letters drafted in accordance with the
requirements of Form S-1 in conjunction with discounts on capital shares
and shares having liquidation preferences of the character referred to
are more elaborate than opinions relative to the legality of the securities
being registered. These would seem to be an opinion as to the law, rather
than as to a legal fact. This is particularly so where the authorities re-
lied upon are not on all fours with the facts surrounding the issuance of
the securities in question. Opinions of counsel as to the legality of se-
curities being registered, on the other hand, would appear to be more in
the nature of an opinion of legal fact in many instances.
Purchase agreements between a selling corporation, or stockholder,
and the representative of a group of underwriters require extensive
opinions of counsel for the selling party, as well as counsel for the repre-
sentative. The underwriters may be liable to persons subsequently buy-
ing the securities if they cannot establish the burden of proof that, in the
exercise of reasonable care, the underwriters could not have known of
any untruth or omission in a prospectus used in the sale." The under-
writers rely on the opinions of counsel to aid in meeting this obligation.12
As a condition to the obligations of the selling group, various repre-
sentations and warranties made by the seller must be verified by coun-
sel's opinion. Such opinions commonly state that the company is duly
8 Securities and Exchange Commission, Form S-1: Registration Statement Under
The Securities Act of 1933, as in effect 2-20-58, Instructions As To Exhibits (6)
(Hereinafter cited as Form S-i).
9 Form S-1 at (8).
10 Form S-1 at (9).
11 Securities Act of 1933 § 12 (2).
12 Op. cit. supra n. 3.
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incorporated and in good standing in its state of incorporation, empow-
ered to carry on the business in which it is engaged, duly qualified to do
business and in good standing in states in which it is doing business,
opinions as to the standing of subsidiaries of the company, if any, the
nature and validity of the company's interest in them, that the corpo-
ration has an authorized capitalization as disclosed in the financial state-
ments, and that the stock of the company is validly issued, fully paid and
non-assessable. I3
If bonds or other evidence of indebtedness are sold under the agree-
ment, the opinion will state that the bonds are validly authorized and
issued obligations of the company and binding on the company according
to their terms, and that the security for such bonds is validly authorized,
executed and delivered. 1 4 Counsel must further state that he has no rea-
son to believe the registration statement or prospectus contain any un-
true statement of a material fact or fail to state any material facts. 15
Counsel's opinions in merger transactions include verification of
statements relative to the validity of issuance of the stock involved, as
well as other appropriate corporate matters similar to the statements
noted above. Such opinions also commonly include counsel's opinion
relative to the tax consequences of the transaction. 0
In sales of property, opinions of the seller's counsel to the buyer
generally recite that the title to the property being sold is good and un-
encumbered, and that the sale is one which the selling party is capable
of making. In addition, opinions as to other matters of import to the
buyer, relative to the particular property, will be required. A common
example is an opinion as to the nature of applicable zoning restrictions. 7
To some extent counsel's opinions relative to real property are similar to
opinions rendered by abstracters of titles, although they may not be
issued in the same context, nor guaranteed or insured, as those of a title
company usually are.
The opinions required in the transactions referred to here are prin-
cipally of the legal fact variety and this kind of opinion predominates in
letters connected with closings involving corporate parties. One attorney
interviewed referred to this type of opinion as routine.'8 Under particu-
lar circumstances an opinion of law may be required in any of these
transactions, but since the facts involved in such opinions are character-
ized by their novelty, it is not meaningful to treat these opinions indi-
vidually or attempt to list them.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Interview with Columbus, Ohio attorney, March 1967.
17 Interview with Cleveland, Ohio attorneys, February 1967.
18 Op. cit. supra n. 4.
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Possible Liability to a Non-Client
Opinions of legal fact are analogous to opinions of title rendered by
abstracters or attorneys in conveyance transactions and presumably the
law governing the liability of counsel with respect to such opinions is
analogous to the law which has developed in the area of opinions of title.
However, in such transactions the attorney rendering his opinion is not
in a situation wholly comparable to counsel for either party in a typical
business transaction. It is apparently settled that abstracters of title are
liable to their clients for negligence in preparation of an opinion of title. 19
This liability arises out of the contract of employment with the duty of
care toward the client being provided by the contractual link between
them. Good faith on the part of the abstracter in performing his contract
of employment has no effect on his liability to the client.20
Since the abstracter's duty arises from his contract of employment,
he is generally not liable to any party not in privity with him but who
may rely on his opinion and suffer an injury therefrom. 21 An exception
is made where the opinion is rendered for the benefit of a third party
and the abstracter has notice that the opinion will be relied upon by that
particular designated or identified third party.22 The fact that it is cus-
tomary to procure certification of title when interests in land are to be
conveyed is not a basis for liability of the abstracter to an injured pur-
chaser who has relied on the title report.23
Liability of counsel for his opinions has also generally been limited
to his clients only, based upon the theory of privity between counsel and
his client. If counsel negligently renders an opinion which injures his
client, the client may recover damages for counsel's negligent breach of
the contract of employment between them.2 4 However, recovery by non-
clients for "wrong" opinions negligently rendered by counsel to his client
and resulting in damage to such parties by reason of their reliance on
such opinions, has been denied due to the absence of privity.
An exemplary case is National Savings Bank v. Ward'5 in which the
defendant, an attorney, rendered an opinion stating that the client's title
to real estate was good and unencumbered. In fact the property had been
conveyed out by the client. The plaintiff bank took a mortgage on the
client's non-existent interest, and when the client defaulted, the bank
sued counsel for the resulting loss. The Supreme Court (with three
19 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 11 (1936).
20 Id. § 11(a).
21 Id. § 11(c).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Gleason v. Title Guarantee Company, 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
25 100 U.S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1880).
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Justices dissenting)26 denied recovery to the bank on the ground that
there was no privity between the bank and defendant counsel. It rea-
soned that injury to the bank was not foreseeable by counsel since coun-
sel rendered the opinion to his client and had no knowledge of any trans-
action that the client may have been involved in at the time.
The aspect of foreseeability of harm as a limitation to the liability of
the party rendering the opinion is really the essence of the privity doc-
trine. As such, it presents a significant problem of jurisprudence, since,
in the area of many commercial transactions at least, the identity of per-
sons who ultimately may be injured and the extent of the damages may
not be reasonably foreseeable by one rendering an opinion upon which
these persons may rely. On the other hand, the parties injured may suffer
extensive losses as a direct and proximate result of reliance on an opin-
ion of counsel, and it is of little comfort to them to say that they had no
right to rely on the opinion.
The competing interests of the specifically unforeseeable injured
party and the designer of an opinion were attempted to be rationalized
in the case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven and Co.2 7 Here the
plaintiff, a factor, sued an accounting firm which had certified the in-
accurate balance sheet of a borrower, one cause of action was based on
the firm's alleged negligence in certifying the borrower's balance sheet.
With respect to that cause of action the court noted the decay of the doc-
trine of privity, but held that where the negligent act is an "honest blun-
der," the liability is limited by the contract. The defendant accountants
did not know that their certification was to be relied on by the plaintiff
and the court pointed out that if there was liability for negligence in such
a case, it would subject the accountants to "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 28
The import seems to be that the privity limitation is a mechanism by
which liability for inordinately large and remote damages to unforesee-
able plaintiffs is limited.2 9 When viewed from this standpoint the doc-
trine of privity appears to be not only reasonable in its effect, but per-
haps a necessary limitation to the liability for ordinary negligence of
individuals in the business of rendering opinions since the personal risks
for mistake in such a vocation would otherwise be prohibitive.30
26 The dissenting Justices argued that the attorney was chargeable with knowledge
of a sale or similar transaction by virtue of the fact that he was asked for an opinion
of title by the alleged owner of the property and therefore the harm to the bank was
reasonably foreseeable even though the attorney was not aware that the plaintiff
bank was involved in the transaction.
27 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
28 Id., 174 N.E. at 444.
29 See generally, Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Em-
ployer for Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 371.
80 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra n. 27.
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The doctrine of privity is not without limits. In the Ultramares case
the court held that although the accountants did not owe a duty of due
care to the plaintiff because of the lack of privity, a duty of not commit-
ting fraud in rendering their opinion was owed to the plaintiff.31 In its
decision relating to a cause of action for fraud, the court found that if
the certification was so negligently performed that the accountants could
not have known whether their statements were correct, they would be
guilty of fraud, regardless of whether they honestly believed their state-
ments to be true. The difference between "honest blunder" and "fraud"
therefore depends on the degree of negligence involved in the particular
facts being litigated; the limits of privity lack definiteness.
The protection afforded by privity is also contingent upon the party
to whom the representations are made. When the declarer of negligent
misrepresentations is aware of the specific party who is to rely on the
representations, liability for the negligence can attach.32 Limitation of
liability to a specific known party is reasonable as far as it goes, but
strictly applied seems somewhat arbitrary and mechanical. The Re-
statement of Torts,33 which does not rely on privity,34 suggests that the
liability for negligent misrepresentation should extend to the class of
persons for whose guidance the information is prepared and who rely on
the information in the transaction for which the information was pre-
pared. In such a case, the privity concept is replaced, at least in part, by
a requirement of knowledge of the nature of the immediate transaction
and the facts surrounding it on the part of the one making the repre-
sentations. 35 Counsel with knowledge of a given transaction can reason-
ably be found to know the class of individuals who may rely on his opin-
ion, and the nature of their possible injuries, even if he cannot foresee
their individual identities.
In the case of Lucas v. Hamm 36 a beneficiary under a will sued the
attorney who drafted the will when the interest given the beneficiary
failed to vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities. The
court found a privity relationship between plaintiff and defendant on the
basis of a third-party beneficiary, or tri-partite, contract of employment
between the testator and counsel. It was held that an attorney can be
liable to a non-client party damaged by counsel's failure to "properly
31 Id., 174 N.E. at 444.
32 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); Cole v. Vincent, 229 App.
Div. 520, 242 N.Y. Supp. 644 (1930).
33 Restatement, Torts, § 552. Liability of Abstracters of Title held to be in contract
or tort. See also Hawkins v. Oakland Title Insurance and Guarantee Co., 165 Cal.
App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958).
34 Id. at comment c.
35 Id. at comment g.
36 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
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fulfill his obligations under his contract" in such a situation."7 It was
further held, however, that counsel was not liable under the facts of the
case due to the technicalities and intricacies involved in application of
the rule against perpetuities.31
Lucas v. Hamm is perhaps the first case in which a court has asserted
that there is liability on the part of an attorney for negligent injury to a
non-client party by breach of the attorney-client contract. This decision
is specific to the drafting of wills, yet it is possible that its rationale may
be extended to establish privity between counsel and a non-client party
to a business transaction involving counsel's client, where counsel's opin-
ion is rendered to a non-client party.39 Whether an action brought on
such a contract theory will have the effect of enlarging the specific per-
son exception to the privity doctrine toward the class of persons limita-
tion recommended by the Restatement of Torts remains to be seen, but
such an extension would seem to provide a contract oriented parallel to
the pragmatic Restatement of Torts outlook.4"
Statutory Liability
The Securities Act of 1933, Section 11, provides a liberal theory of
recovery which could be asserted against counsel for opinions rendered
in conjunction with a Registration Statement. Section 11 provides that
where a Registration Statement contains a false statement of a material
fact, or fails to state a material fact required to be stated, anyone acquir-
ing the security has standing to bring suit against any person with re-
spect to the statement made, which person's profession gives authority
to the statement made by him and who has, with his consent, been named
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation used in connec-
tion with the Registration Statement. 41 In such an instance, the party
bringing the action apparently does not have to prove reliance upon the
misrepresentation unless he purchased the security in question more than
twelve months after the Registration Statement became effective and
subsequent to a financial report being published by the company.42
37 Id., 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
38 Id, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
39 See generally Martindale, Attorneys Liability in Non Client and Foreign Law
Situations, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 44 (1965).
40 This suggestion is not new; see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. at 445 and
the cited materials. The discussion does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of
the metastable state of the law relative to misrepresentation, either negligent or
"fraudulent." Certainly it would behoove counsel to approach the preparation of an
opinion letter for a non-client as if he could be held liable both for negligent mis-
representation and fraud (conscious ignorance) as a result of any material error in
his opinion.
41 Sec. 11(a) (4) of the Act.
42 House Committee Report No. 1838 (conference report) 73rd Congress, Second Sess.
(p. 41).
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Counsel, since he is not an expert as defined by Section 11 (a) (4) of the
Act, may avail himself of various defenses made available by the Act.
43
There are a number of lawsuits currently pending against firms of
Certified Public Accountants in which the alleged liability is based upon
reliance of non-client parties on the opinions of the Certified Public
Accountants. 44 In view of the popularity of such actions it is not un-
reasonable to assume that sooner or later a party, injured as a result of
a business transaction, will seek to recover damages from counsel for
another party to the transaction based upon a "wrong" opinion. The
possibility of liability of attorneys to non-clients in such an action is no
secret, there just has not been a recent test of the old barriers. 45
Lenders are aware of the possibility of recovery from counsel for a
borrower when the lender has relied on counsel's opinion to his detriment
in the transaction. 46 It appears, however, that some financing institu-
tions, while fairly certain that they can recover, are reticent to litigate
for business reasons.4 7 Such reticence decreases as the damage to the
institution is significant and counsel for the borrower is the only solvent
party. One bank counsel interviewed harbored little doubt that an attor-
ney could be successfully sued as a result of an incorrect opinion.48
One private practitioner stated that certain "loan sharks" require
counsel for the borrower to render opinions which counsel, in good con-
science, could not have reason to believe to be true.49 Since such opin-
ions are required at the closing, it is a matter of "no letter, no loan." As
indicated previously, counsel thus is placed in a conflict with his client.
By their actions such lenders would seem to be aware of the possibility of
counsel's liability. In trying to force counsel into the position of render-
ing ill advised opinions they may, in effect, obtain a guarantor. Certainly
counsel's acquiescence to such demands should not be given merely be-
cause the lender's insistence would be a possible defense in a later suit
by the lender against the attorney. Here if counsel protests the require-
ment that he render an "opinion" relative to facts as to which he has no
knowledge, stating his reasons in writing before acquiescing to continu-
ing unreasonable demands, it would be difficult for the lender later to
establish reliance on that opinion.
43 Letters submitted to the S.E.C. in connection with a Registration Statement com-
monly include a paragraph authorizing counsel's name to be listed under the "Legal"
Section of Prospectuses.
44 Metz, Accounting Profession, Vexed By Lawsuits, Weighs Responsibility to Share-
holders, New York Times, November 20, 1966 (33) p. 1.
45 Glanzer v. Shepard and Cole v. Vincent, supra n. 32.
46 Interview with bank counsel, February 1967.
47 ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with Cleveland attorney, March 1967.
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Opinions of counsel relative to the registration and sale of corporate
securities are also such as could subject counsel to personal claims
against him. Counsel involved in these areas of practice expressed the
opinion that there is a definite possibility of liability upon opinions in-
volved in such transactions. 50
Opinions of counsel relative to property being sold are already with-
in the ambit of the decisions establishing the liability of abstracters of
title to parties other than their clients.51
Considerations in Preparing Opinion Letters
Obviously counsel is not liable for every opinion he renders which
eventually turns out to be wrong. Attorneys are not insurers of the cor-
rectness of their opinions.5 2 Certainly where the opinion required is one
which is of the opinion of law type, counsel who predicts the outcome of
future litigation incorrectly cannot be said to have been negligent in
reaching his opinion by reason of mere incorrectness alone. Additionally,
the complexity of the area of the law to which the opinion relates tends
to limit the liability of counsel for his errors, as is indicated in Lucas v.
Hamm.5 3 Opinion of law opinions are undoubtedly the most difficult
opinions to formulate and draft from counsel's standpoint, but it seems
that counsel's personal liability resulting from an incorrect opinion of
this type is a more remote possibility than for an incorrect opinion of
legal fact. This is particularly so where counsel is aware of the distinc-
tion and is guided accordingly.
Notwithstanding the remoteness of liability for opinions of law, there
are matters of format and content in such letters which, if adhered to by
counsel, will produce a more satisfying letter to its recipient and which
will help avoid future questions relative to the basis for the opinion. It
is basic that the opinion be understood by the person to whom it is trans-
mitted.5 4 An opinion which hedges, or is couched in esoteric language
which the ordinary person would not readily understand, does not fulfill
its purpose.5 5 Moreover, the Restatement of Torts places a duty of exer-
cising care and competence in communicating the information which the
recipient is justified in expecting. 56 Apparently under the Restatement
view, counsel can assiduously research the law and come up with a satis-
factory opinion for his own purposes, but nevertheless subject himself to
50 Interview with Cleveland attorney, March 1967.
51 1 C.J.S. Abstracts of Title § 11 (c) (1936).
52 National Savings Bank v. Ward, supra n. 25.
53 Supra n. 36.
54 See, Cooper, Effective Legal Writing (1953).
55 Ibid.
56 Op. cit. supra n. 33.
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the possibility of liability on his opinion for failing to communicate his
thoughts to the recipient of the letter. As far as counsel's legal liability
upon his opinion of law is concerned, the safest opinion would appear to
be one which is unhedged and direct.
The letter should specifically state all of the facts relied on by coun-
sel in formulating his opinion, whether supplied to him by the parties,
determined by investigation of counsel or inferred by counsel, and the
opinion should be expressly limited to these facts.57 Such statements not
only assure the recipient of the letter that counsel is answering the ques-
tion asked of him, but will protect counsel in the future when the facts
have changed, or if the facts were not as represented.5 Counsel often
cite cases which they have found to support their conclusions so that
there is a memorandum of record which discloses how a particular con-
clusion was reached. 5
9
It is apparent that the opinions of counsel referred to in connection
with closings are generally of the legal fact kind, and while these opin-
ions are more easily arrived at than an opinion of law, they can be dem-
onstrated to be wrong as a matter of fact. Moreover, the preponderance
of these opinions are critical to the rights and obligations of the parties
to the transaction. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that if counsel
is liable on his opinion to a non-client party in a transaction, this is the
kind of opinion upon which his liability can be most easily predicated.
The content of opinion letters delivered at closings is to a large ex-
tent dictated by the agreement between the parties. Financial institu-
tions generally use form paragraphs in loan agreements, particularly in
the warranty or "acts" sections of the agreements, and counsel's opinion
with respect to warranties made are expected to conform to the language
of these sections. 60 Any variance is closely scrutinized and lenders may
refuse to accept opinions containing material variances from the lan-
guage of the agreement without adequate justification.61 Some agree-
ments, such as underwriting agreements, include exhibits of opinion let-
ters to be received by the various parties on the closing date.6 2'
Where counsel is involved in drafting the agreement, he will have
some control over the content of the letter to be drafted for the closing.
Thus counsel may be able to eliminate from the requirements of the
opinion letters subject matter with respect to which he may be unwilling,
57 Op. cit. supra n. 6.
58 Op. cit. supra n. 53.
59 Id. Citations are also apparently in vogue as a means for justifying bills as well as
feeding the client's ego.
60 Op. cit. supra n. 46.
61 Ibid.
62 Interview with Cleveland attorney, March 1967.
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or unable, to render his opinion; 63 an example of such subject matter
might be facts not germane to counsel's function or with which counsel
has no familiarity.
With the opinion portion of counsel's letter substantially fixed as to
content and form by the language and terms of the agreement, the re-
mainder of the letter should be devoted to setting forth the facts upon
which counsel relies, how he was informed of the facts, what steps he has
taken to investigate and determine the facts, and references to corrob-
orating material of which he is aware. 64
Where counsel represents a corporate party to a transaction, he will
in many cases find it necessary to examine the constitution and statutes
of the state of the incorporation, the charter and bylaws of the corpora-
tion, the records of the proceedings of its incorporators, directors and
stockholders, the contracts which the corporation is a party to, state and
federal regulations, if any, which may affect the corporation relative to
the agreement, as well as other records which are pertinent in the cir-
cumstances.65 If counsel renders numerous opinions relative to the cor-
poration in question, it has been suggested that he update his most re-
cent investigation of the same facts from the date of his last opinion.66
However, undiscovered errors in prior investigations may be com-
pounded by adherence to such a practice.
Counsel should list in his letter the investigative steps he has taken
in formulating his opinion. If he relies entirely on information given him
by parties to the transaction, he should so state in the letter and state
that he has made no investigation relative to the information but does
not have reason to believe it to be false. In cases where great masses of
documents are reviewed and investigation is otherwise extensive, it may
be impractical to limit the opinion to the investigative steps taken and
in such cases counsel should concentrate on disclosing in the letter what
steps were not undertaken.
Counsel should obtain corroboration for his opinions wherever pos-
sible. Certificates of good standing should be obtained which bear the
date of the opinion letter and such certificates should be referred to in
the letter. Opinions relative to title of property should be supported by
opinions from title companies. Opinions relative to tax incidents to
transactions, such as mergers, should be supported by obtaining Revenue
Rulings where possible. In short, counsel should seek to rely on inde-
pendent materials which support the legal facts represented by his opin-
ions.
63 Interview with Cleveland attorney, February 1967.
64 Op. cit. supra n. 61.
65 See generally Riordan and Wragg, Examination Of Corporate Books In Connec-
tion With Stock Offerings And Acquisitions, 18 Bus. Law 677 (1963).
66 Ibid.
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DRAFTING OPINION LETTERS
As previously noted, counsel should be careful to limit his opinions
to the facts known to him either by inclusion of the facts relied on and
expressly limiting the letter thereto, or by disclosing the facts relied on
by him but which he has not personally determined. Most often opin-
ions which are rendered without investigation are conditioned by a state-
ment that counsel has no reason to believe the statements or warranties
made by a party to be false, although counsel has not personally checked
their accuracy. Obviously, the most important consideration in drafting
any such portion of an opinion letter is that of leaving no doubt in the
mind of a reader that counsel has not determined the absolute accuracy
of such facts so that the reader is not justified in relying on any investi-
gation counsel might have, but did not make.
There are circumstances in which counsel should take care to ex-
pressly decline to render any opinions. Generally counsel should decline
to render his opinions with respect to any fact other than a legal fact
since it is not counsel's function to attest to non-legal matters relative
to the transaction, and further since it is meaningless to render an opin-
ion as to a fact determinable by anyone. An example of a fact relative
to which counsel should unequivocally decline to make any statement
is that the financial statements of his client are accurate. If accountants
can be liable on their opinions relative to financial statements, counsel
is clearly in no position to render his opinion on such matters, as he is
not professionally equipped to do so.
Where counsel is to render his opinion relative to the accuracy of
statements made in a document separate from the agreement, counsel
should review the document to determine what portions, if any, are not
subject matter for his opinion and expressly render no opinion with re-
spect to them. Such a situation arises in underwriting agreements where
counsel is required to state that he has no reason to believe that a regis-
tration statement and prospectus contain an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or fail to state any material fact, since registration statements
and prospectuses contain financial data with respect to which counsel
should render no opinion.
It should be apparent from the foregoing that although opinion let-
ters at closings may be routine in nature, counsel must diligently investi-
gate the facts to which his opinion relates, obtain corroborating data for
the facts found whenever possible, expressly delimit the bases for opin-
ions where appropriate, and expressly render no opinions relative to
matters outside of counsel's responsibility or competence.
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Conclusions
It is believed that counsel can be held liable to a non-client based
upon counsel's opinion relative to a legal fact. There are large numbers
of legal facts to which counsel attests in opinion letters written in con-
junction with a closing; the subject matter of these legal facts opinions is
often of material importance in the transaction; the letters at closing are
required as a condition precedent to the closing and are relied on; and
non-clients commonly require such letters to be addressed to them rather
than to counsel's client. Under such circumstances liability can be based
on a conscious ignorance, fraudulent misrepresentation theory, as well as
on negligent misrepresentation. There are apparently no recently de-
cided cases on point, but analogies to existing case law are possible.
Moreover, the development of the law relating to misrepresentation is
perceptible, particularly in view of the continuously diminishing pro-
tection afforded by the doctrine of privity. In addition, there is an
increasing awareness of the possibility of liability on the part of sophis-
ticated counsel frequently involved in such transactions.
The elements of legal facts opinions which make them dangerous are
those that make rendering opinions relative to legal facts relatively easy.
Accordingly, thorough investigation and thoughtful drafting of the opin-
ion should keep counsel well clear of the frightening consequences of a
business transaction which has not worked out.
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